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Briefing for the Secretary of State

Strategic Arms Control Prospects for 1968

The recent State study on U.S.-Soviet military relationships prepared by Ambassador Kohler, Mr. Bowie and others, foresees the continued growth of U.S. and Soviet strategic arms inventories over the next eight years, without adding anything to the security of either side. As the study shows, in evaluating the effect of possible, though greater than expected, Soviet threats over the next eight years, the U.S. "assured destruction" capability in 1976 will probably be less than it is today, though still adequate. This is apparently the best we can hope for from a continuing spiral of arms increases. At worst, continued competitive procurement could lead to a net decrease in our security, since the uncertainties and misperceptions associated with a continued dynamic strategic race can lead to periods of instability during which the risks of nuclear war could be heightened. Furthermore, if the arms race continues, these uncertainties could well have a multiplying effect on both sides' actions in procuring arms even beyond those anticipated in this table.

Their current arms programs suggest that the Soviets are seeking a strategic posture which will be recognized as comparable to ours. They may even seek to surpass us in certain areas for prestige and power-political reasons. If the Soviets are determined to achieve what they consider strategic superiority, then there is little hope that any equitable arms control agreement can be

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achieved. But there are reasons why the Soviets, too, should wish to forego the tremendous costs and risks of such a race.

Our private approaches to the Soviets on discussions of limits on strategic weapons have not yet produced a satisfactory Soviet response. But now that we have reached agreement with the Soviets on an NPT draft, including an article which commits parties to pursue measures toward cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, the prospects for discussions may improve.

In anticipation of these discussions, ACDA and State have during the past year developed and recommended U.S. positions on controlling strategic weapons systems. The Committee of Principals considered such a position paper last March. In September, the Secretary of State sent to the Secretary of Defense another such State/ACDA paper of more limited scope. The State Legal Counsel has recommended more radical steps, involving significant reductions. We have taken the recommendations of these papers into account in preparing this briefing of our recommended further approach to the control of strategic armaments.

Our briefing today will outline the points which we believe should constitute the basis for our preparations for initial discussions with the Soviets. It will cover what we consider to be our objectives in strategic arms control, general principles on which we believe the discussions should be based, and on which we would hope to secure Soviet agreement, strategic and technical factors which we believe will affect the nature of possible agreements, some alternative possible measures from which specific proposals might be developed, and, finally, what we think our next step should be.

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We have identified what appear to us to be three principal common U.S.-Soviet objectives:

1. To achieve and maintain a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic deterrent relationship at a minimum acceptable level, by controlling the growth and destabilizing qualitative improvements in strategic armaments.

2. To minimize the prospect of destabilizing actions by other nations by demonstrating to other nations U.S. and Soviet willingness to accept constraints on their strategic nuclear forces, in accordance with the commitments contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty Draft.

3. To improve political detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union by establishing a continuing process of discussion of issues arising from our strategic military relationship.

Given progress towards these objectives, we might then want to consider if it would be in the U.S. interest to strive for adequately verified significant reductions in nuclear delivery vehicles.

Our analysis during the past year of the problems of limiting strategic weapons has led us to believe that prospects of an agreement rest on the acceptance of the following general principles by both sides.

1. A strategic arms limitation agreement must provide balanced strategic postures acceptable to both sides. The recent State study noted that the traditional "box score" comparisons of U.S.-Soviet strength relationships are becoming increasingly subject to varied interpretations and possible manipulation for polemic purposes. Particularly,

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the terms "parity" and "superiority" have become difficult to define meaningfully. The asymmetries in geography, population concentration and technological emphasis alone make it virtually impossible to equate the strategic requirements of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in terms of specific numbers and types of weapons systems. The terms "superiority" and "parity" are applicable to such things as numbers of missiles or total yields of weapons, but are not useful in describing the overall strategic relationship when each side has more than enough power to destroy the other. For example, we now possess a "superiority" in numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs and probably in MIRV technology. The Soviets now have a great "superiority" in missile-deliverable megatonnage and in numbers of IR/MRBMs, and may soon have a "superiority" in numbers of ICBMs. We are not primarily concerned with Soviet advantages in one area or another, however, and should not attempt to match the Soviets directly in each dimension of their strategic strength.

Thus what is important is not "parity" or "superiority" but each side's perception of its strategic sufficiency. However, perceptions of strategic sufficiency are based both on one's own capabilities and on the estimated capabilities of the other side. Therefore if one side possesses advantages in too many areas or too great an advantage in a single significant area, the other side will not be able to perceive the situation as providing it strategic sufficiency. Conversely, however, it should be possible to arrive at postures which contain some quantitative and qualitative asymmetries, but in which both sides believe the asymmetries generally balance each other. Such a balanced posture appears the only reasonable basis on which to expect both the U.S. and the Soviets to agree. If either we or the Soviets

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insist on striving for overall strategic "superiority," no agreement will be possible, unless one side or the other decides to quit the race. There are no indications that the Soviets would choose such a course now or in the immediate future. If discussions with the Soviets are to have any real chance of leading to agreement, we must recognize the psychological-political importance to the Soviets of the principle of overall balance.

As we see it, the choice is not between arms control measures which might leave the U.S. a meaningful overall strategic advantage and those which do not, but rather between pursuing a costly and dangerous arms race in an attempt to maintain a strategic advantage and adopting a strategy of arms control based on recognition of the fact that neither side will willingly concede to the other a position of perceived significant strategic advantage.

2. Both sides should be confident of a reasonable second strike deterrent force. This is probably the least common denominator interpretation of what would be a strategic relationship acceptable to both sides in any strategic arms control agreement. The corollary of this is, of course, that neither side should strive for a first-strike counter-force capability. While the Soviets have never publicly subscribed to our "assured destruction" strategy and may not accept or even really understand it, we would hope to convince them that, until such time as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles can be eliminated altogether, a stable second-strike deterrent force at minimal necessary force strengths is the most secure posture for both sides.

3. Unilateral verification will be adequate for a limited range of strategic arms control measures. For a really comprehensive measure, supplementary inspection arrangements will be necessary. In general, restrictions on numbers of fixed strategic missile launchers can be

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verified by national intelligence means. Violations of restrictions on numbers of submarine-based launchers can also be detected by unilateral means, though only after the submarines are operationally deployed.

Compliance with a prohibition or a limitation on production of land-mobile missile systems could not be verified without inspection of production facilities. Deployment of such systems would be detected eventually by unilateral means, although perhaps not until substantial numbers had been deployed.

Verification of restrictions on new system characteristics, such as MIRVs, which can be installed on existing missiles, will present difficult problems. Unilateral MIRV verification capabilities are limited to the flight testing activities during development or confidence firings. The U.S. currently has the capability to detect at least full range flight testing. It is considered unlikely that a nation would deploy MIRVs, at least those with a high accuracy requirement, without a number of full range flight tests. A prohibition on such testing should therefore be sufficient to prevent Soviet deployment of an effective MIRV system without warning. In that case, restrictions on MIRVs could be accepted with only unilateral verification. If, however, it is considered that full range flight testing would not be essential, or that flight testing could be disguised or concealed, or if flight testing has already occurred, then on-site inspection of the missile reentry vehicles would be required if MIRVs are to be prohibited with confidence.

Thus some meaningful limitations on strategic armaments could be accepted with only unilateral verification arrangements. As agreements become more comprehensive, both in the scope of the various systems

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to which they are applied and in their restrictions on qualitative improvements, some inspection will be necessary. Major reductions in strategic forces, to the point where the balance would be significantly affected by relatively small violations, would also clearly require inspection. We believe, however, that the necessary inspection arrangements for an agreement need not be nearly as pervasive as those included in past U.S. proposals. If the Soviets are interested in an arms control agreement they might be willing to take some steps to eliminate those uncertainties which otherwise would prevent obtaining and maintaining an agreement.

4. The first step in achieving strategic arms control should be to control the further growth of strategic forces. Although the Soviets rejected our 1964 "freeze" proposal, they may be more receptive to a proposal which would leave them at or near the current strategic relationship. The U.S. should press for initial agreements to control the further growth of strategic armaments. Quantitative restrictions would be relatively simple to define and, to a significant degree, we believe, could be adequately verified unilaterally. Containing the strategic competition in this manner would be significant in its own right and could be a "turning-point" leading to more extensive and meaningful measures. However, the characteristics of strategic missiles are becoming more important than mere numbers, and unless the arms race is simply to be transferred to another arena some qualitative curbs will be necessary.

If the Soviets insist on including reductions, we should agree to consider such measures once we have made progress on controlling the arms race. Reduction schemes are complex, and would have to

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be subjected to further careful analysis. While token reductions appear feasible, the potential benefits of deep reductions will have to be weighed against the possible instabilities which could result if either side felt it no longer possessed a secure second-strike capability.

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Consistent with the foregoing principles, the strategic and technical factors and the alternative measures we will present deal only with limitations on strategic offensive and defensive missile launchers and MIRVs. These systems represent the dominant element of the U.S.-Soviet strategic equation and in our opinion most urgently require control.

Detailed analyses within ACDA have pointed up the significance of certain technical and strategic factors which we think will be most important in shaping the specific nature of meaningful strategic missile limitation agreements. They can be summarized briefly as follows:

1. ABM Systems

The unrestricted deployment of urban ABMs would run counter to the maintenance of assured deterrence objectives and increase strategic uncertainties. As severe limitations as practicable should therefore be placed on the level of "urban" ABM deployment on both sides.

ABM defenses of missile sites (so-called hard-point defenses), on the other hand, should be considered separately from urban ABMs and can be more loosely constrained. Hard-point systems can have a stabilizing effect upon the strategic balance by enhancing the invulnerability of existing fixed

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ICBM systems without increasing the counterforce threat to the other side.

The most effective way of restricting ABM systems would be to prohibit deployment of terminal defenses around cities, limit the number of urban "area" interceptor launchers to minimal numbers, and, if necessary, allow appropriate levels of terminal hard-point defense deployments. Such quantitative limitations can, we believe, be adequately verified by unilateral means.

2. MIRVs

Deployment of highly accurate MIRVs can contribute to possible unstable counterforce first-strike situations by enabling one attacking missile to destroy a number of fixed ICBM launchers. Deployment of MIRVed ICBMs by both sides would increase the attraction of preemption. Moreover, in an arms race context, the inability to estimate with confidence whether or not MIRVs are deployed, how many are on one missile, and what accuracies they have, would create serious uncertainties leading to over-compensations and higher force levels. A failure to prohibit MIRVs would undercut much of the value of a freeze on numbers of missile launchers alone. If such crucial missile characteristics as MIRVs are not controlled at this time, the prospects of containing one of the most significant components of the strategic arms race--qualitative improvements--would greatly diminish over the next decade.

The U.S. is planning to deploy MIRVs for penetration purposes as a hedge against possible future large Soviet ABM systems. If Soviet ABMs could be limited to low levels by an agreement, the U.S. could maintain an assured destruction capability without deploying MIRVs. In the event the Soviets were to abrogate such a limited ABM

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agreement and rapidly deploy urban ABMs, there is some question, because of relative lead-time problems, as to whether U.S. assured destruction capabilities could be maintained without interruption if we had not completed flight testing of the Poseidon and Minuteman III MIRVed systems.

There are two possible candidate measures for control of MIRVs: a prohibition on deployment only, or a prohibition on flight testing and deployment. A prohibition on deployment, but permitting flight testing, would be the most favorable for U.S. strategic capabilities, in that it would permit U.S. preparations to deploy MIRVs quickly as a response to Soviet abrogation of restrictions on ABM, but it would be the worst from the standpoint of the verification problems posed. It would probably also be unacceptable to the Soviets if they are not near to a capability to flight test.

A prohibition on MIRV flight testing and deployment would of course be more restrictive, and in a context where numbers of strategic offensive and defensive launchers are frozen at acceptable levels with adequate verification, would probably be the only measure acceptable to both sides if the verification problem can be solved.

In view of the threat which Soviet clandestine deployment of accurate MIRVed systems would pose to U.S. security, and of the advanced state of U.S. preparations for MIRV flight testing, the U.S. should not accept any restrictions on MIRVs without confidence in its capability to verify future Soviet compliance with such restrictions within acceptable risks. There are wide differences of opinion as to whether U.S. security would be adequately protected by restrictions on MIRV flight testing to be verified by unilateral means, and warranted skepticism about the possibilities of the Soviets' accepting even minimal on-site inspection to verify compliance with a prohibition on deployment.

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If the Soviets are really concerned about our planned deployment of MIRVs, however, and are in fact significantly behind us in the development of MIRV technology, they might be willing to accept a ban on flight testing and deployment, involving some on-site inspection of deployed missiles.

In view of the serious destabilizing impact which MIRV deployment would have on the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, we believe it important to seek a limitation on MIRVs in any strategic arms control measure. If the Soviet Union will not accept on-site inspection of missile reentry vehicles, and the U.S. will not accept unilateral verification of restrictions on MIRVs, then it will not be possible to prevent MIRVs. If we enter negotiations with the Soviets and reach an impasse on MIRV verification, we may want to reevaluate our position on verification if it appears that the Soviets are otherwise willing to agree to significant measures which are in the U.S. interest. We do not believe it is necessary or desirable to make the decision as to the only verification arrangements under which we will accept MIRV restrictions until we have conducted at least exploratory discussions with the Soviet Union.

3. Fixed Strategic Missile Launchers

There are two reasons why fixed ICBM launchers are an important target for control. First, since the number of Soviet ICBM's is increasing and may well continue to increase above the number we have, it is important to the U.S. to stop them now rather than let the Soviets build up large numbers (on which they may later be able to install MIRVs). Secondly, it should be relatively easy to secure limits on this type of strategic system because the Soviet Union is rapidly approaching equality with the U.S. in numbers, because we believe they can be

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verified with considerable confidence by unilateral means, and because numbers of ICBMs are becoming less important than qualitative improvements such as MIRVs.

With missile accuracies improving, hardened ICBM sites on both sides will tend to become increasingly vulnerable to counterforce attacks, whether or not accurate MIRVs are deployed by an adversary, thereby creating possible instabilities. Additional deployments by both sides cannot stabilize this situation, but vulnerabilities could be reduced by deploying hard-point defenses around existing sites "frozen" under an agreement or by introducing superhardened sites.

Soviet IR/MRBM launchers are only marginally relevant in strict terms of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. We should not insist that they be added to Soviet ICBM launchers in reaching an ICBM balance. However, limiting IR/MRBMs is important to the U.S. for both political and verification reasons. We are concerned with the potential threat to Western Europe and if IR/MRBMs, are not limited, the Soviets might attempt to expand their ICBM force above agreed limits by disguising them as IR/MRBM launchers. IR/MRBMs should therefore be included in any freeze or reduction agreement.

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4. SLBM Submarines

SLBMs will probably retain their relative invulnerability over the next decade despite progress in ASW capabilities; their survivability will not be threatened by MIRV's. Therefore, SLBMs will tend to assume a larger role in "assured destruction" in the years to come. This is especially true of the planned U.S. MIRVed Poseidon. Unilateral capabilities are, we believe, adequate to verify limitations on numbers of ballistic missile submarines within acceptable risks.

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The Soviets, with a relatively small SLBM force, are beginning to deploy new-generation "Polaris-type" submarines. Even a substantial increase in Soviet SLBM strength would not have adverse consequences for the U.S.'s deterrent capability. At the same time, the Soviets will probably insist that some increase in their SLBM strength is necessary in order to maintain their assured destruction capabilities, particularly in an agreement in which U.S. MIRVs are not prohibited.

5. Land-Mobile ICBM's

The U.S. is currently not seriously considering deploying a land-mobile ICBM. While the present intelligence estimate is that the Soviets have not yet deployed land-mobile ICBM's, they do appear to be interested in mobile missiles, and are capable of deploying an operational mobile ICBM in a few years. Since mobile ICBM's are relatively invulnerable, they could serve as a supplement or alternative to additional Soviet SLBM's in maintaining their assured deterrent in the face of the potential first-strike counter-force option of very accurate U.S. MIRV's. However, since mobile ICBM's are virtually "uncountable," permitting even a limited number of these systems would create great uncertainties. A total prohibition should therefore be imposed on introducing such systems, despite limitations on our verification capability, in order not to leave open to the Soviets this option for increasing their strategic offensive forces.

Before we discuss alternative measures to limit strategic missile systems, we would like to mention briefly the problems of missile reductions and bomber limitations.

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We recognize that some political advantages would accrue from any U.S.-Soviet agreement to couple even modest missile reductions with any "freeze" measure, particularly as viewed by the non-nuclear states in the context of the NPT. The obvious reductions to consider would be systems which are fast approaching obsolescence.

The Soviet SS-6s and soft SS-7s and U.S. Titans are systems which could be eliminated relatively easily by both sides; a number of soft Soviet IR/MRBMs could also be eliminated. Although token reductions would be of little strategic significance and would not entail appreciable risks, the possible symbolic value of such steps should not be underestimated. More substantial reductions require further careful analysis regarding their impact on stability and the increased significance of verification at lower force levels. One important and somewhat contradictory point is that missile reductions appear more feasible when coupled with an agreement which does not restrict MIRVs, since reductions in numbers of launchers have less bearing upon assured destruction capability if those that remain are equipped with MIRVs, especially if launchers are protected by hard-point defenses.

Strategic bombers, of course, do contribute to the deterrent capabilities of both sides, and limits on their numbers can be unilaterally verified. However, the inclusion of bomber restrictions could complicate agreements by raising such questions as the non-nuclear use of strategic bombers and the control of tactical aircraft. If the Soviets insist on discussing bombers, we should be prepared to do so. One important issue which makes this a complex question results from the asymmetry in strategic bomber capabilities.

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Our analyses show that in most second-strike situations, U.S. bombers alone could be expected to inflict considerably more Soviet fatalities than Soviet bombers could inflict on the U.S. in a reverse situation.

Because of a variety of political and strategic uncertainties, the objectives, principles, and factors discussed earlier do not lead unambiguously to a single "best" agreement. However, we think we have a sufficiently clear understanding of the "boundaries" and essential elements of alternative agreements to enter into discussions. From here on we shall focus on three basic alternative possible missile limitation agreements. Each will be briefly outlined and the essential rationale and implications highlighted. The decision as to which of these measures or variations thereof should eventually become the specific measure upon which we seek agreement should await further analysis and particularly the insights into Soviet thinking which we hope to gain from discussions with them.

The three possible measures we have under study are all the same in two respects. Each would limit numbers of fixed land-based ICBM launchers to roughly 1,000. Each would also permit the deployment of the currently planned Sentinel system, and would permit the Soviets a comparable ballistic missile defense.

In addition to these restrictions common to all measures, the first measure would also limit the number of ballistic-missile-firing submarines on both sides to mid-1968 levels, prohibit deployment of land-mobile ICBMs, and freeze Soviet IR/MRBM launchers at present numbers. It would not restrict MIRVs. This might be our initial proposal when we get to the negotiating stage with the Soviets.

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Such a measure would not affect currently planned U.S. programs. In fact, if the US does have a lead over the USSR in the development of MIRVs, the near-term U.S. relative strategic posture under this measure would be better than it will be if the USSR, in the absence of any agreement, continues to deploy ICBMs and SLBMs.

The Soviets might well perceive US ABM and MIRV deployment under such a measure as seriously degrading their deterrent capabilities, and would therefore be unlikely to find such a measure attractive.

In addition, non-nuclear nations are not likely to interpret such a measure as a significant step toward fulfillment of the nuclear nations' commitment in Article VI of the NPT draft to pursue negotiations on measures toward cessation of the nuclear arms race and toward disarmament.

The second measure under study would differ from the first only in that it would permit the Soviet Union to restore its deterrent capability against US Sentinel and MIRV deployment by constructing some additional sea-based ballistic missile launchers. We consider this a possible US fall-back position from the first measure discussed, consistent with the principle that each side will require a confident second strike deterrent posture.

Planned US programs would not be affected. The U.S. would maintain an advantage in MIRVs and in strategic aircraft and in its overall deterrent capability.

Since this measure would involve greater increases in US-Soviet strategic armaments than the first, it

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would be even less attractive to the non-nuclear powers as a step toward cessation of the nuclear arms race. As a measure of disarmament, we should seek reductions in Soviet IR/MRBM or ICBM launchers on a one-for-one basis exchange for additions to the number of their submarine launcher tubes. .

Our third measure is the same as the first in that it would freeze ABM at the Sentinel level of deployment, freeze fixed ICBM launchers at about 1000 on each side, prohibit land mobile ICBM launchers, and freeze SLBMs and Soviet IR/MRBMs at mid-1968 levels. It differs significantly from the first two in that it includes restrictions on MIRVs.

The US MIRV program has been publicly justified as a measure to insure US capability to penetrate an expanded Soviet ABM defense. If the Soviet ABM can be limited as proposed, we should therefore not need MIRVs to maintain our deterrent. In turn, a prohibition on MIRVs would eliminate a perceived counterforce threat to the Soviet Union and thus remove an incentive for the Soviets to seek additional offensive missiles in order to maintain their deterrent.

In the absence of a capability to deploy MIRVs quickly, there would be an element of uncertainty for both sides in the fact that the deterrent capability of either side could be temporarily degraded in the event the other were to abrogate the agreement and rapidly expand its ABM deployment. Since the initial deterrent capability of the Soviet Union would be lower than that of the U.S., the significance of this threat would be greater for the Soviet Union than for the U.S. A prohibition on MIRVs, coupled with a restriction on launcher numbers, would of course curtail

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the growth of the offensive threat and thereby reduce the incentives for either side to abrogate an ABM agreement.

The threat offered by the possibility of Soviet abrogation and expansion of its ABMs might be hedged against by making the ban on MIRVs less than total. Instead of prohibiting all MIRVs, the agreement might permit MIRVs on either land-based or sea-based launchers. This would hardly seem negotiable, however, if the Soviets are far behind us in MIRV technology. In addition there would be the verification problems, already discussed in connection with the prohibited system. As another possibility, flight testing of MIRVs might be permitted with a prohibition only on MIRV deployment. This option would permit rapid US deployment of MIRVs if necessary to restore its penetration capability against an expanded Soviet ABM, but it would also present a verification problem in that on-site inspection would be necessary to insure that MIRVs were not installed in deployed systems.

Under the first two measures discussed, MIRVs would provide us with a confident deterrent capability even if the Soviets were permitted as many as 1000 urban ABM launchers. But with a prohibition on MIRVs, the adequacy of the US deterrent might be questionable if Soviet ABM launchers were to number over 600 to 700, because even Soviet hard-point defenses would probably be so located that they could contribute to urban defense. We should therefore probably make the acceptance of a ban on MIRV deployments contingent on limiting total Soviet ABM defenses to this number, which is approximately equal to the currently planned Sentinel system.

Among the three measures considered, this measure including a prohibition on MIRVs involves the least

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further expansion of existing armaments. If the verification problems can be solved, and the risks inherent in the possibility of Soviet abrogation are determined to be tolerable, this measure would seem the most desirable from both the US and the Soviet standpoint. It would also have the most appeal to non-nuclear nations who are urging the US and the Soviet Union to limit the nuclear arms race.

This is the measure, therefore, which we feel should be our preferred negotiating goal with the Soviets.

While we believe that these measures just outlined present a range of alternatives acceptable to US security, we wish to subject them to further analysis in order to be able to state with confidence their quantitative impact on both US and Soviet perceived requirements for deterrence. To help us in this analysis, and to provide material for discussion with the Soviets prior to the time we will want to make any specific proposal, we need consensus in the government on a number of issues which will have a significant bearing on the nature of an agreement which would be acceptable to the United States.

First, we believe that the objectives, the principles, and the technical-strategic factors which we have discussed today are sound and also critical to the nature and scope of any agreement we may be able to reach with the Soviet Union. If we are not able to reach a substantial degree of understanding with the Soviets on these points, we will not be able to reach an agreement because we and the Soviets will be pursuing incompatible goals.

We therefore propose, as our next step, to submit for consideration by the Committee of Principals a statement of these objectives, principles and

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technical-strategic factors for their approval as initial points for discussions with Soviets and as the guidelines for a proposal for use when we reach the negotiating stage with the Soviets. We should await the development of some further insight into Soviet thinking and a display of interest by the Soviets in serious negotiations before surfacing a specific US proposal.

Another issue which should be decided soon is what further steps, if any, we would take to obtain discussions with the Soviets. If within a reasonable period we have no firm indications that the Soviets are prepared to commence discussions, we could make another inquiry, based perhaps on our common commitment under Article VI of the NPT draft, and timed to follow some milestone in progress toward achieving final agreement on the treaty. Such an approach, we believe, should not be in the form of a new proposal. Rather, it should be in the form of a proposed agenda for discussions of arms control objectives and principles, and of the technical-strategic factors which will shape the nature and scope of possible strategic arms limitations agreements.

If this approach should fail to produce a satisfactory Soviet response, then we may want to consider steps to make clear to other nations our willingness to limit strategic arms.

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